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Abstract
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay with intrinsic motivation and
social distance. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the e↵ect of incentive
pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with
one social group relative to another. In a randomised field experiment undertaken
across 151 villages in South India, local agents were hired to spread information
about a public health insurance programme. In the absence of incentive pay, social
distance impedes the flow of information. Incentive pay increases overall agent
e↵ort and appears to cancel out the negative e↵ects of social distance.
JEL Codes: C93, D83, I38, J32, O15
Key words: public services, incentive pay, social distance, knowledge trans-
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1 Introduction
Economists tend to believe in the power of incentives and prices to improve e ciency,
whether the aim is to motivate workers or eliminate social ills such as discrimination.1
Yet both theory and evidence suggest that there are circumstances in which there are
⇤We thank Oriana Bandiera, Arunish Chawla, Clare Leaver, Gerard Padro´ i Miquel, Vijayendra Rao,
E. Somanathan and seminar participants at Bristol, IGC Growth Week 2011, IGC Patna meeting 2011,
ISI Delhi, JNU, LSE, Oxford and Warwick for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge funding
from Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (iiG), a research programme consortium funded by
DFID, as well as the International Growth Centre. Any views expressed are the authors’ own and not
necessarily shared by the funders.
†Correspondence: Erlend Berg, University of Bristol, Department of Economics, 8 Woodland Road,
Bristol BS8 1TN, United Kingdom. Email: erlend.berg@bristol.ac.uk Tel: +441173310500
1Bandiera et al. (2011) and Prendergast (2015) review the evidence. Becker and Posner (2009) and
Sandel (2012) provide di↵erent perspectives.
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grounds for caution: First, if there are multiple tasks or output is hard to measure,
financial incentives may have undesirable consequences (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991;
Gneezy et al., 2011). Second, in jobs with an aspect of social service, as in public goods
provision, or if reputation matters, workers may not be ‘in it just for the money’. It has
been argued that financial incentives may interfere with or even ‘crowd out’ such intrinsic
motivation (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Third, theory
suggests that aligning the identities of economic agents can increase e ciency (Besley
and Ghatak, 2005; Francois, 2000), and there is evidence that ethnic fragmentation and
‘social distance’ can lead to worse economic outcomes (Easterly and Levine, 1997). But
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) argue that when group identity is salient, monetary incentives
can be ‘both costly and ine↵ective’.
However, evidence on the e↵ect of incentive pay on performance in pro-social tasks is
still limited,2 and very little is known about the interaction of incentive pay and social
distance.3
In this paper we develop a theoretical model and provide empirical evidence on the role
of incentive pay in spreading information about a public service in a socially heterogeneous
population. We study whether incentive pay is e↵ective in settings where output is noisy
and crowding out is a possibility, and whether incentive pay ameliorates or exacerbates
the potentially detrimental e↵ects of social distance.
A simple theoretical framework is developed which combines elements of a motivated-
agent framework (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) with the multi-tasking model (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991). The framework predicts that when there is a single task and the
agent is intrinsically motivated, e↵ort is always weakly increasing in the part of the agent’s
compensation that is dependent on success (the ‘bonus’). But when there are two tasks,
which di↵er in terms of the agent’s intrinsic motivation to succeed and in the marginal
cost of e↵ort, the e↵ect of bonus pay will depend in part on the degree of substitutability
in the cost of e↵ort across the two tasks. If substitutability is low, increasing bonus pay
will lead to an increase in the agent’s e↵ort with respect to both tasks. But if the two
tasks are relatively substitutable in the cost function, an increase in bonus may cause
e↵ort in one task to decrease while e↵ort in the other increases. This can be interpreted
as incentive pay ‘crowding out’ intrinsic motivation for one of the tasks.
We then analyse data from a field experiment conducted across 151 villages in Kar-
nataka, India, in the context of a government-subsidised health insurance scheme aimed
at the rural poor. In a random sub-sample of the villages (the treatment groups), one local
2Ashraf et al. (2014) find that both non-financial and financial rewards have stronger e↵ects for agents
that are socially motivated. Dal Bo´ et al. (2013) conclude that higher wages do not have adverse selection
e↵ects in terms of public service motivation. Rasul and Rogger (2016) suggest that the use of incentives
can negatively a↵ect aspects of performance in the Nigerian Civil Service. Finan et al. survey recent
evidence on the role of incentives in the public sector.
3The literature on discrimination suggests that competitive markets can remove the e↵ects of social
distance to the extent that these cause ine ciencies (Lang and Lehmann, 2012).
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woman per village was recruited to spread information about the scheme. These ‘knowl-
edge agents’ were randomly assigned to either a flat-pay or an incentive-pay contract.
Under the latter contract, the agents’ pay depended on how a random sample of eligible
households in their village performed when they were surveyed and orally presented with
a knowledge test about the scheme.
Our main empirical findings are as follows: First, hiring agents to spread information
has a positive impact on the level of knowledge about the programme. The e↵ect is driven
by agents on incentive-pay contracts. Households in villages assigned an incentive-pay
agent score on average 0.25 standard deviations higher on the knowledge test than those
in the control group, and are also 8 percentage points more likely to enrol.
Second, social distance between agent and beneficiary has a negative impact on knowl-
edge transmission. But putting agents on incentive-pay contracts appears to increase
knowledge transmission by cancelling (at our level of bonus pay) the negative e↵ect of
social distance. Incentive pay has no impact on knowledge transmission or enrolment for
socially proximate agent–beneficiary pairs. The result appears to be symmetric across so-
cial boundaries, in the sense that it holds whether the agent is from a high- or low-status
caste group. Our preferred interpretation is that, with respect to their ‘own’ group (so-
cially proximate households), agents were already at a maximum e↵ort level and hence,
introducing bonus pay has no impact. However, non-incentivised agents choose a lower
level of e↵ort with respect to the ‘other’ group (socially distant households). With in-
centive pay, e↵ort goes up to the same level as for the agent’s own group. Incentives
appear to ‘price out prejudice’, although social distance barriers can operate through
channels other than prejudice. We do not observe crowding out empirically, but it could
still happen outside the range of observed parameter values.
Third, incentivised agents appear to achieve higher knowledge scores by reallocating
time away from socially proximate households (their ‘own group’) towards socially distant
households (their ‘cross-group’), without increasing aggregate time spent. The findings
are consistent with a story in which non-incentivised agents spend more time than needed
with their ‘own group’ because it is enjoyable rather than productive (‘idle chatter’).
Incentivised agents channel some of this time toward productive use with households in
the ‘cross-group’.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, it
presents the first randomised evaluation of incentive pay for agents tasked with providing
information about a public service. An important aspect of service delivery is to make
intended beneficiaries aware of their entitlements. Even if there were no supply-side
problems—if the quality of schools and health centres were excellent and these facilities
were widely available—the outcome would be disappointing if beneficiaries were unaware
of the services or did not value them su ciently (due to, say, a lack of information or
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present bias). While this is a recognised problem in rich countries,4 the issue has not
received much attention in developing countries. There is, however, reason to believe
that the problem is no less important there: a recent report on public services in India
shows programme awareness to be very low among target groups (World Bank, 2011).5
It is thus important to understand the role of incentives in raising awareness of social
programmes, a context in which pro-social motivation is likely to feature.
The second main contribution is to extend our understanding of the interaction be-
tween incentive pay and social distance. The question of whether incentive pay alleviates
or exacerbates the negative consequences of social distance has not received much at-
tention. Bandiera et al. (2009) study the interplay of social connections and financial
incentives in the context of worker productivity in a private firm in the United Kingdom.
They find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favour workers with whom they
are socially connected; but when incentive pay is introduced, managers’ e↵orts do not
depend on social connections. Our paper is related, but as Bandiera et al. (2011) point
out, provision of incentives for pro-social tasks raise di↵erent issues compared to private
tasks for several reasons, including the possibility of crowding out.
There is a growing literature on the importance of information campaigns in economic
decision-making and, in particular, the demand for public services. Previous work has
explored how information campaigns a↵ect local participation and educational outcomes
in India (Banerjee et al., 2010a), how providing information on measured returns increases
years of schooling (Jensen, 2010) and how creating awareness about HIV prevalence
reduces incidence of risky sexual behaviour among Kenyan girls (Dupas, 2011).6
There is substantial evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is linked to poor economic
outcomes, including sub-optimal provision of public goods and poor governance (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Kimenyi, 2006). A possible explanation for this
is that people prefer to interact with those who are similar to themselves, leading to
fragmented markets, lower social mobility (Bertrand et al., 2000) and reduced gains from
trade (Anderson, 2011). Several studies find evidence of strong own-group bias (Banerjee
and Munshi, 2004; Kingdon and Rawal, 2010), with potentially adverse implications for
the flow of information. In the context of awareness campaigns, if people prefer to liaise
with their own kind, information constraints on the demand for public services may be
4Information costs are often argued to be one of the main reasons for low take-up of various welfare
programmes in developed countries (see Hernanz et al. (2004)). For example, in the US, Aizer (2007)
finds that eligible children do not sign up for free public health insurance (Medicaid) because of high
information costs, and Daponte et al. (1999) find that randomly allocating information about the Food
Stamp Program significantly increases participation amongst eligible households.
5According to this report, the level of nationwide awareness regarding the National Rural Employment
Guarantee, one of the flagship anti-poverty schemes of the Government of India, was around 57% in 2006,
with some of the poorer states like Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh, where one would expect demand
for such schemes to be high, doing worse at 29% and 45%, respectively.
6In the context of the government health insurance scheme studied here, Das and Leino (2011) analyse
an information campaign in North India and get mixed results.
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more severe in socially heterogeneous settings. However, micro-level evidence on the role
of social distance in the spreading of awareness about public services is rare.
This paper is also related to the rich literature on the role of monetary and non-
monetary incentives on the performance of agents. This body of work encompasses studies
in the ‘standard setting’ of firms in developed countries where output or productivity is
measurable but worker e↵ort is not (Lazear, 2000), as well as papers on incentives for
teachers and health workers in developing countries as surveyed by Kremer and Holla
(2008) and Glewwe et al. (2009). Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) and Duflo
et al. (2012) study the e↵ect of financial incentives for teachers on absenteeism and test
scores, while BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) look at the role of incentives in leveraging
peer learning to promote the adoption of agricultural technologies in Malawi.
There are also studies looking at the role of agents’ intrinsic motivation and identi-
fication with either the task at hand or the intended beneficiaries in reducing the need
for explicit incentives (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003; Besley
and Ghatak, 2005). In a laboratory setting, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find non-
monotonicities in the e↵ect of incentive pay on e↵ort. But as Bandiera et al. (2011) point
out, there is little field-experimental evidence in this area, although Ashraf et al. (2014)
is a recent exception.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, a simple theoretical frame-
work is presented with the aim of analysing the impact of incentive pay on agents’ e↵ort
and its interaction with social identity matching. Section 3 describes the context, ex-
perimental design and data. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence and Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we develop a simple model of motivated agents. It extends Besley and
Ghatak (2005) by incorporating features of the multi-tasking model (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom, 1991). The aim is to provide a theoretical framework that can generate predictions
about the e↵ects of incentive payment and how these might interact with the e↵ects of
social distance.
Suppose agents exert unobservable e↵ort in spreading awareness of a scheme to po-
tential beneficiaries. The goal may be either the transmission of knowledge itself or to
increase programme enrolment. The principal can be thought of as a planner (say, the
relevant government agency) who values either awareness of or enrolment in the pro-
gramme among the eligible population. A given agent can interact with an exogenously
fixed number of target households.
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2.1 A Single Task
First, assume there is a single task. This may correspond to a situation in which the
potential beneficiaries of the public service are relatively homogeneous. Let e be the
unobservable e↵ort exerted by the agent. Let the outcome variable Y be binary and
of value 0 or 1, with the former denoting ‘bad performance’ or ‘failure’ and the latter,
‘good performance’ or ‘success’. For example, a group of beneficiaries doing well in
the knowledge test (say, scoring above a certain threshold level), or enrolling in the
programme, might be considered a success. The agent’s e↵ort stochastically improves
the likelihood of a good outcome. To keep things simple, assume that the probability of
success is p(e) = e, so that attention is restricted to values of e that lie between 0 and
1. Let us further assume that the lowest value e can take is e 2 (0, 1), and the highest
value e can take is e 2 (e, 1). This means that there is some minimum e↵ort that any
agent supplies and that even with this minimum e↵ort, there is some chance that the
good outcome will happen. There is also a maximum level of e↵ort, but even at that
level, the good outcome is not guaranteed to occur. Therefore, as is standard in agency
models, there is common support. That is, either value of the outcome is consistent with
any value of e↵ort in the feasible range. It is also assumed that both the principal and
the agent are risk-neutral.
Let the agent’s disutility of e↵ort be c(e) = 12ce
2. If the project succeeds, the agent
receives a non-pecuniary pay-o↵ of ✓—this is her intrinsic motivation for the task—and
the principal receives a pay-o↵ of ⇡, which may have a pecuniary as well as a non-
pecuniary component. The planner’s pay-o↵ incorporates both the direct benefit to the
beneficiaries and how the rest of society values their welfare. In the absence of incentive
problems, the problem is
max
e
(✓ + ⇡) e  1
2
ce2,
subject to e 2 [e, e]. The solution is
e⇤⇤ = max
⇢
min
⇢
✓ + ⇡
c
, e
 
, e
 
.
It should be noted here that the e↵ect of ✓ and c on e are similar although opposite
in sign: an agent puts in more e↵ort when the disutility of e↵ort decreases or the non-
pecuniary payo↵ from success increases. Conceptually, and hence empirically, it is hard
to distinguish between the two.
If e↵ort is contractible, the principal can simply stipulate e⇤⇤ . For the problem to be
interesting, and for incentive pay to have an e↵ect, assume that there is moral hazard in
the choice of e↵ort. Also, agents have zero wealth and there is limited liability: the agent’s
income in any state of the world must be above a certain minimum level, say, ! > 0.
From the principal’s point of view, this creates a tension between minimising costs and
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providing incentives. In the absence of a limited liability constraint, the principal could
have achieved the first-best outcome by imposing a sti↵ penalty or fine for failure. With
limited liability, the only way the principal can motivate the agent, beyond relying on her
intrinsic motivation ✓, is to pay her a bonus that is contingent on performance. In choosing
the bonus for the agent, the principal has to respect the limited-liability constraint (LLC)
and the incentive-compatibility constraint (ICC). There is also a participation constraint
(PC) which requires the agent’s expected pay-o↵ to be at least as high as her outside
option. To keep things simple, assume that the outside option is relatively unattractive
so that the PC does not bind—the analysis is qualitatively unchanged if this assumption
is relaxed.
Let w be the pay the principal o↵ers to the agent in the case of success, and let w be
the pay in the case of failure. Define b ⌘ w   w, which can be interpreted as bonus pay
with w as the fixed wage component. Then the agent’s objective is
max
e
(✓ + w)e+ w(1  e)  1
2
ce2
subject to e 2 [e, e], which yields
e = max
⇢
min{b+ ✓
c
, e}, e
 
. (1)
This is the ICC. Since b  ⇡, e↵ort will, in general, be lower than in the first-best scenario.
This can be formally seen as follows. The principal’s objective is7
max
w,w
(⇡   w) e  w(1  e),
subject to the ICC (1), the LLCs w   ! and w   ! and the PC
(✓ + w)e+ w(1  e)  1
2
ce2   u.
Since we ignore the PC (which is justified if u is small enough), the optimal contract is
easy to characterise (see Besley and Ghatak, 2005, for details). Since the agent is risk-
neutral, w will be at the lowest limit permitted by the LLC, namely w = !. The solution
for optimal bonus then follows:
b = max
⇢
⇡   ✓
2
, 0
 
7In the formulation presented here it is assumed that the principal does not put any direct weight on
the agent’s welfare but does take into account the welfare of the beneficiaries. An alternative formulation
would be to put a weight   on the welfare of the beneficiaries and a weight 1     on the welfare of the
agents. This would lead to higher incentive pay and higher e↵ort.
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Note that optimal bonus is strictly smaller than ⇡.
The e↵ort response is only observed experimentally for two values of b, so the focus
here will be on the ICC (1) rather than the optimal bonus. If there is no bonus pay and
the agent is not su ciently intrinsically motivated, we may get a lower corner solution,
namely e = e. This will be the case for e   ✓c . At the other extreme, if the agent
is su ciently motivated (namely, ✓c   e), then even without any bonus pay the agent
chooses the maximum level of e↵ort e. Otherwise, e↵ort is increasing in bonus pay.
The solution is illustrated in Figure 1. The slope of the interior-solution segment (1c ) is
positive and so is its intercept ( ✓c ). However, depending on parameter values, the value
of e for any given value of b could range from e to e. For example, the case of a relatively
unmotivated agent is captured by the dashed vertical line marked by ce > ✓. In this case,
the vertical axis (at which b = 0) intersects the e↵ort curve at a flat section where e = e.
Similarly, a case where the agent is relatively highly motivated is captured by the dashed
vertical line marked by ✓ > ce, and an intermediate level of motivation is captured by
the line marked ce < ✓ < ce. In the former case, the agent is at the minimum e↵ort level
for b = 0 and initially the marginal e↵ort with respect to bonus pay is zero. As bonus
pay increases further, the marginal e↵ort becomes positive, before returning to zero once
the e↵ort curve has hit the upper bound. If the vertical axis is at the right-most dashed
vertical line, then the agent is already at the maximum e↵ort level when b = 0 and e↵ort
will be unresponsive to incentive pay at any level. If the vertical axis is at the middle
dashed line, e↵ort level is at an interior value when b = 0 and the marginal e↵ort with
respect to bonus pay is positive.
2.2 Two Tasks
Assume now that the agent has two tasks, as in the multi-tasking model. The tasks may
be thought of as the agent exerting e↵ort to transfer knowledge to, or enrol, two di↵erent
types of beneficiary households. However, unlike in the classic multi-tasking model, the
outcomes associated with the two tasks are assumed to be equally measurable. Instead,
the di↵erences between the two tasks are in the agent’s intrinsic pay-o↵ from success and
her cost of e↵ort. Extending the notation from the previous section, let Y1 and Y2 be the
binary outcomes for the two tasks and e1 and e2 the corresponding e↵ort levels.
It is assumed that the principal is constrained to o↵er the agent the same conditional
payments for the two tasks. That is, the payment in the case of success must be the
same for task 1 and 2, as must the payment in the case of failure. This is justified if the
principal is politically, socially or legally constrained to o↵er the same pay rates for all
tasks. The assumption is also justified if the relevant characteristics of the households
are not observable to the principal. For example, a knowledge agent may be biased in
favour of some social or economic group or may have purely idiosyncratic biases, but if
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the principal does not observe the relevant dimension, the remuneration scheme cannot
be contingent on it.
Let e and e, where 0 < e < e < 1 , define lower and upper bounds for both e1 and e2,
and let ✓1 and ✓2 denote the non-pecuniary pay-o↵s to the agent from success in task 1
and 2, respectively. Let the agent’s cost of e↵ort be given by
c(e1, e2) =
1
2
c1e
2
1 +
1
2
c2e
2
2 +  e1e2.
The parameter   can be thought of as a measure of the substitutability of e↵ort in tasks
1 and 2 in the cost function. To ensure that the marginal cost of e↵ort in each task is
always positive, it is assumed that     0.
Note that if c1 = c2 =   = c and ✓1 = ✓2 = ✓, the set-up collapses to the single-task
model. Abstracting from the special case c1 = c2 we can, without loss of generality, as-
sume that c1 < c2 and refer to task 1 and 2 as the easier and the harder task, respectively.
The principal values the tasks equally and so receives the same pay-o↵ ⇡ from success
in both. Then the first-best is characterised by
max
e1,e2
(✓1 + ⇡) e1 + (✓2 + ⇡) e2  
✓
1
2
c1e
2
1 +
1
2
c2e
2
2 +  e1e2
◆
.
The first-order conditions yield the following interior solutions:
e1(⇡) =
(c2    ) ⇡ + c2✓1    ✓2
c1c2    2
e2 (⇡) =
(c1    ) ⇡ + c1✓2    ✓1
c1c2    2
For this to be a local maximum, the second-order condition requires
c1c2 >  
2.
As before, corner solutions may be possible. Also, if ei assumes a corner solution, ej
(j 6= i) would take a di↵erent form.
Define the pair:
eˆ1(⇡) =
8>>><>>>:
✓1+⇡  e
c1
ife2(⇡)  e
e1(⇡) ife < e2(⇡) < e
✓1+⇡  e
c1
ife2(⇡)   e
eˆ2(⇡) =
8>>><>>>:
✓2+⇡  e
c2
ife1(⇡)  e
e2(⇡) ife < e1(⇡) < e
✓2+⇡  e
c2
ife1(⇡)   e
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Now the complete first-best solution for the two-task model in is given by:
e⇤1(⇡) = max{min{eˆ1(⇡), e}, e}
e⇤2(⇡) = max{min{eˆ2(⇡), e}, e}
The second-best is characterised as follows. Let w be the wage the principal o↵ers to
the agent conditional on success in a task, let w be the wage conditional on failure and
define b ⌘ w   w. The agent’s objective is to maximise
max
e1,e2
(✓1 + w)e1 + (✓2 + w)e2 + w(1  e1) + w(1  e2)  c(e1, e2).
The first-order conditions yield:
e1 (b) =
(c2    ) b+ c2✓1    ✓2
c1c2    2
e2 (b) =
(c1    ) b+ c1✓2    ✓1
c1c2    2
As in the single-task model, we expect e↵ort levels to be lower than first-best because
the participation constraint of the agent is assumed not to bind. As in the case of the
first-best, corner solutions may be possible, and following the same steps as above, we
can derive eˆ1(b) and eˆ2(b):
eˆ1(b) =
8>>><>>>:
✓1+b  e
c1
ife2(b)  e
e1(b) ife < e2(b) < e
✓1+b  e
c1
ife2(b)   e
eˆ2(b) =
8>>><>>>:
✓2+b  e
c2
ife1(b)  e
e2(b) ife < e1(b) < e
✓2+b  e
c2
ife1(b)   e
The complete second-best solution for the two-task model is given by:
e˜1(⇡) = max{min{eˆ1(b), e}, e}
e˜2(⇡) = max{min{eˆ2(b), e}, e}
Several aspects of the solution are worth noting. First, e1 is always weakly increasing
in b.
Second, e2 is also non-decreasing in b, except when both tasks are at internal solutions
and c1 <   < c2 when it is decreasing in b. The intuition for the negative slope is that
when e↵ort in the two tasks are relatively substitutable and both e↵ort curves are at
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internal solutions, providing a monetary incentive leads the agent to substitute e↵ort
towards the easier task to a degree that causes e↵ort in the harder task to decrease. We
view this as a form of ‘crowding out’ since increasing incentive pay leads the agent to
work less in one of the tasks. However, this is not quite crowding out in the sense of
Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), where the term is taken to imply a decrease in e↵ort overall.
In our case, the sum of e↵ort across the two tasks is always weakly increasing in b. This
follows trivially from the above except when both e↵orts are internal. But then
e1 (b) + e2 (b) =
(c1 + c2   2 ) b+ (c2    ) ✓1 + (c1    ) ✓2
c1c2    2 ,
and c1+c2 2  > c1+c2 2pc1c2 =
 p
c1  pc2
 2
> 0, where the first inequality follows
from the second-order condition, c1c2 >  2.
Third, when both e↵ort curves are internal, the slope of e1 is always greater than the
slope of e2.
Fourth, the slopes of all internal curves are completely determined by  , c1 and c2.
The role of ✓1 and ✓2 is to shift the intercepts, and hence the lengths and meeting points,
of the e↵ort curves’ constituent line segments.
Before classifying the types of possible solutions, it is helpful to define the ‘intrinsically
preferred task’ as the task in which the agent exerts the greatest e↵ort when there is no
bonus pay, that is, at b = 0. Task 1 is the intrinsically preferred task i↵ eˆ1 (0) > eˆ2 (0),
or
✓1
c1 +  
>
✓2
c2 +  
.
Otherwise, task 2 is the intrinsically preferred task. (With equality in the above expres-
sion, e↵ort in each task is equal at b = 0.) Intuitively, a higher ✓i and a lower ci both
contribute to the agent’s intrinsic preference for task i. Note that it is possible that task
2, the harder task, is intrinsically preferred by the agent. This is the case if her intrinsic
pay-o↵ for the harder task (✓2) is large enough to outweigh the cost disadvantage.
The main types of solutions can be classified using the relative magnitudes of  , c1 and
c2. Above, it was assumed without loss of generality that c1 < c2, and the second-order
condition requires c1c2 >  2. The substitutability parameter   must therefore be either
less than both c1 and c2, or equal to c1 and less than c2, or lie between c1 and c2.
Figures 2–4 illustrate representative cases8 where task 1 is intrinsically preferred (e↵ort
in task 1 is greater at b = 0), and moreover, e1 is already at the highest possible level e but
e2 has an interior solution. The latter corresponds to the condition
✓2  e
c2
< e < c2✓1  ✓2c1c2  2 .
As in the single-task model, other solutions can be generated by drawing the vertical axis
just to the left of the crossing point of the two e↵ort curves, in which case task 2 would
be intrinsically preferred. Also illustrated are the ‘kinks’ in e2 that arise as e1 meets the
8Appendix A discusses how these relate to the universe of possible cases.
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upper or lower bounds.
Solutions with   < c1 < c2 (relatively low task substitutability) are illustrated in
Figure 2. In the centre of the figure, both e↵ort curves are internal and positively sloped,
while the slope of e1 is greater than that of e2.
Figure 3 illustrates the case   = c1 < c2. Here, e↵ort in task 2 is temporarily satiated
while both e↵ort curves are internal. Again, which task is intrinsically preferred depends
on the position of the vertical axis.
Figure 4 illustrates the case c1 <   < c2 (relatively high task substitutability). This is
the only case that permits ‘crowding out’, that is, a phase in which e↵ort in one task (task
2) decreases with increasing bonus pay. As illustrated, crowding out can only happen
when both e↵ort curves are internal. Again, the intrinsically preferred task is determined
by the position of the vertical axis.
Mapping the theory to the experimental setting, each of the model’s two tasks can
be thought of as corresponding to a group of eligible households in the agent’s village.
In the empirical analysis we find that, in the absence of bonus pay, agents tend to exert
a greater e↵ort with respect to households who are similar to themselves in terms of
social characteristics. The model’s ‘intrinsically preferred task’ therefore corresponds to
households who are socially proximate to the agent. These households will also be referred
to as the agent’s ‘own group’. Households who are socially distant from the agent (the
‘other group’) correspond, in the model, to the task that is not intrinsically preferred.
Which task is intrinsically preferred depends on ✓i and ci, both of which are in principle
unobservable. Therefore, while the agent’s ‘own’ group will be mapped to the intrinsically
preferred task, it is not always possible to deduce whether this is task 1 (the easier task)
or 2 (the harder task).
Note that we have modelled the agent’s e↵ort but not her time use. Some of the
results presented below suggest that these are not the same: agents appear to be able
to hold e↵ort constant while varying the time spent on a task. Our interpretation is
that agents are able to control the intensity of e↵ort (e↵ort exerted per unit of time)—in
particular, they may engage in enjoyable but idle ‘chatter’ with their friends.
3 Context, Experimental Design and Data
3.1 The Programme
The experiment was conducted in the context of India’s National Health Insurance
Scheme (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana—henceforth, RSBY). The scheme was launched
by the central government in 2007 with the aim of improving the ‘access of BPL [Be-
low the Poverty Line] families to quality medical care for treatment of diseases involving
hospitalisation and surgery through an identified network of health care providers’ (Gov-
12
ernment of India, 2009). Each state followed its own timetable for implementation, and a
few districts from each state were selected for the first stage. In Karnataka, five districts
were selected (Bangalore Rural, Belgaum, Dakshina Kannada, Mysore and Shimoga), and
household enrolment in these districts commenced in February–March 2010 (Rajasekhar
et al., 2011).
The health insurance policy covers hospitalisation expenses for around 700 medical
and surgical conditions, with an annual expenditure cap of 30,000 rupees (652 USD) per
eligible household.9 Each household can enrol up to five members. Pre-existing conditions
are covered, as is maternity care, but outpatient treatment is excluded.
The policy is underwritten by insurance companies selected in state-wise tender pro-
cesses. The insurer receives an annual premium per enrolled household,10 paid by the
central (75%) and state (25%) governments. The beneficiary household pays only a 30
rupees (0.65 USD) annual registration fee.
Biometric information is collected from all members on the day of enrolment and
stored in a smart card issued to the household on the same day.11 Beneficiaries are
entitled to cashless treatment at any participating (‘empanelled’) hospital across India.
Both public and private hospitals can be empanelled. Hospitals are issued with card
readers and software. The cost of treating patients under RSBY are reimbursed to the
hospital by the insurance company according to fixed rates.
3.2 Experimental Design
151 villages were randomly selected from two of the first-phase RSBY districts in Kar-
nataka: Shimoga and Bangalore Rural. In the first stage of randomisation, some villages
in our sample (112 out of 151) were randomly selected to be part of the treatment group,
i.e. receive an agent, while the remaining form the control group. In each treatment
village, our field sta↵ arranged a meeting with the local Self-Help Groups (SHGs).12 All
SHGs contacted were female-only. In the meeting, SHG members were given a brief
introduction to RSBY and told that a local agent would be recruited to help spread
awareness of the scheme in the village over a period of one year. They were told that
the agents would be paid, but no further details on the payment were given at that time.
In each case, a single candidate was nominated by the group and recruited on the same
day. Except in two cases where the selected agent was a non-member recommended by
9Here and later, we use the currency exchange rate as per 1 July 2010 according to www.oanda.com
(46 rupees/USD).
10The annual premium is determined at the state (and sometimes district) level, and is currently in the
range of 400–600 rupees (9–13 USD). In Karnataka, the annual premium in the first year of operation
was 475 rupees.
11According to RSBY guidelines, smart cards should be issued at the time of registration, but this is
often not adhered to. For more detail, see Rajasekhar et al. (2011).
12Self-Help Groups are savings and credit groups of about 15–20 individuals, often all women, that
meet regularly. All government-sponsored SHGs in the village were invited to the meeting.
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the SHG, the nominated agent was a member of the SHG. In about a third of the cases,
the president of the SHG became the agent. All agents were female.
Once the meeting was concluded and the agent selected, she was taken aside and
given a more thorough introduction to the scheme, including details on eligibility criteria,
enrolment, benefits and other relevant information. An agent background questionnaire
was also fielded at this time.
The payment scheme was revealed to the agent only after recruitment. Each treatment
village had been randomly allocated to a payment structure, which constituted the second
stage of randomisation, but this information was kept secret. Even our field sta↵ did not
know about the contract type until after the agent had been selected. The day after
recruitment, the agent was called up and informed of her payment scheme. There were
two payment schemes, defining the two treatment groups. Flat-pay agents were told that
they would be paid 400 rupees every three months. Incentive-pay agents were told that
knowledge of RSBY would be tested in the eligible village population every three months.
The agent’s pay would depend on the results of these knowledge tests. There would be
a fixed payment of 200 rupees every three months, but the variable component would
depend entirely on the outcome of the knowledge tests in the village.13
The bonus payments were determined as follows: A random sample of households
eligible for RSBY in each village was surveyed and orally presented with the knowledge
test.14 A household was classified as having ‘passed’ the test if it answered at least four
out of eight questions correctly. The proportion of passing households in a village was
multiplied by the number of eligible households in that village in order to estimate the
total number of eligible village households that would have passed if everybody had taken
the test. The bonus was calculated as a fixed amount per eligible household estimated
to pass the test in a village, and set in such a manner that the average bonus payment
across each of the two study districts would be 200 rupees per agent. The households
taking the tests were not told how they scored, nor were they provided with the correct
answers.
Thirty-eight villages/agents were assigned to the flat-pay treatment group, and 74 to
the incentive-pay treatment group. Agents were told that there would be other agents in
other villages, but not that there was variation in the payment scheme.
The purpose of not revealing the payment scheme until after recruiting the agent
was to isolate the incentive e↵ect of the payment structure from its potential selection
e↵ect. None of the agents pulled out after learning of the payment scheme. However, four
13As part of the original experimental design, we also provided a second type of incentive pay to some
agents based on programme utilisation by the beneficiaries in their village. But because the scheme was
hardly operational during the period of our study, overall utilisation of RSBY across Karnataka was very
low. See Rajasekhar et al. (2011) for details. These agents and the corresponding villages are excluded
from the analysis presented here.
14For each survey wave, a fixed number of households per village were targeted, and on average 13
household were interviewed per village per wave. The average sample village had 229 eligible households.
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agents dropped out 6–12 months after recruitment. Three of these were in incentive-pay
villages, while the fourth was in a flat-pay village. In each case, the reported reason was
either childbirth or migration away from the village. The agents were replaced, but the
villages in question are excluded from the analysis presented here. Hence, in the analysis
presented here, there are 37 villages with flat-pay agents and 71 villages with incentive-
pay agents, for a total of 108 agents in 108 treatment villages. The number of control
villages remains 39, so the total number of villages in our final sample is 147.
One question of interest is whether eligible households knew the type of payment
scheme the agent in their village was on. We do not have data on this, but on balance
we believe that most did not. When asked to nominate an agent, the group was told the
work would be remunerated but given no further details. We were careful to tell the agent
about the type of contract in private, after selection, and away from the group. When
we returned to make payments, these were also always made in private. The agents were
of course free to tell others of how they were paid, but people locally tend to be reticent
in talking about money. In any case, from a policy point of view one would probably
want to capture the total e↵ect of the contract types inclusive of any additional e↵ect on
eligible households who learn how their agent is paid.
The original plan was to set the variable part of the pay scale for incentive-pay agents
in such a manner that average pay would equal 400 rupees in each of the two treatment
groups. The aim of equalising average pay across the incentive-pay and flat-pay groups
was to isolate the incentive e↵ect of the contract structure (‘incentive e↵ect’) from that of
the expected payment amount (‘income e↵ect’). The pay did in fact average 400 rupees
for one district (Shimoga) in the first survey round and for both districts in the second,
third and fourth rounds. But due to an administrative error, a majority of incentive-
pay agents in Bangalore Rural were overpaid in the first round of payments. In spite of
the error, the rank ordering of agents was preserved in the sense that better-performing
agents were indeed paid more. Nevertheless, we also present results only for Shimoga
district, where average pay in the knowledge group was equal to that of flat-pay agents
(400 rupees) in all rounds.
3.3 Data
Following agent recruitment, four consecutive rounds of ‘mini-surveys’ were fielded. For
each wave, randomly selected eligible households in each sample village were interviewed
to establish the state of their knowledge about the scheme and determine their test scores,
as well as measure their enrolment status. An important purpose of these surveys was
to provide information on agent performance so as to be able to pay the incentive-pay
agents. The households were drawn at random for the first, second and fourth survey
rounds, so that there is a partial overlap between the households in these rounds. The
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first, second and fourth rounds of mini-surveys were based on face-to-face interviews.
For the third survey, the sample from the second survey was re-used, but this time the
households were contacted by telephone. Although not everyone could be reached by
phone, the re-survey rate was significant. 2360 households were interviewed in the first
mini-survey wave, 1931 in the second, 1346 in the third and 2093 in the fourth. In all,
the mini-surveys cover 3998 households, of which 1068 were interviewed twice, 642 were
interviewed three times and 460 were interviewed four times. As the tests were conducted
in every sample village, there was no di↵erence between incentive- and flat-pay agents in
the intensity of monitoring.
Using each household observation as an equally-weighted data point would give more
weight to households that were observed more than once. Observation weights were
introduced to take account of this, so that the total weight across observations equals 1 for
all households. All regressions using data from more than one mini-survey are weighted
least squares. In addition, standard errors are clustered at the village level (Bertrand
et al., 2004). Since serial correlation is probably more severe within a household than
across households within a village, clustering at the village level yields consistent, but
not e cient, estimates.
After the completion of each mini-survey, the agents were revisited and paid. At the
same time, the agents’ knowledge of the scheme was refreshed and added to.
Descriptive statistics on agents are presented in Table 1. Recall that all agents are
female. The average agent is around 35 years old. 88% are married. 58% of the agents’
household heads have completed primary school. 82% of agent households have a ration
card,15 and 38% are from a forward or dominant caste.16 In 29% of the cases, the recruited
agent was the president of a Self-Help Group.17
Table 2 presents summary statistics for households. The average household has 4.8
members. 17% are from a forward/dominant caste.18 In 27% of households, the house-
hold head has completed primary school. 92% have a ration card. It is interesting to
note that agents are more likely than the average eligible household to belong to the
forward/dominant caste category. Agent households are also more highly educated than
15These cards entitle the holders to purchase certain foods at subsidised rates. The cards are intended
for the poor, but because of mis-allocation issues they are an imperfect indicator of poverty.
16In Karnataka, two castes o cially classified as ‘backward’, Vokkaliga and Lingayath, tend to domi-
nate public life. These two have therefore been classified together with the forward caste groups in one
category as ‘dominant castes’.
17The ‘female autonomy’ score was constructed on the basis of the following question fielded to all
agents after recruitment: ‘Are you usually allowed to go to the following places? To the market; to
the nearby health facility; to places outside the village.’ The answer options were ‘Alone’, ‘Only with
someone else’ and ‘Not at all’. For each of the three destinations, agents were given a score of 0 if they
were not allowed to visit it at all, 1 if they were allowed to visit it only with someone else and 2 if
they were allowed to visit it on their own. These three scores were added up to give an autonomy score
ranging from 0 (least autonomous) to 6 (most autonomous). 82% of agents received the highest score, 6.
18As mentioned, eligibility is determined on the basis of BPL (’Below the Poverty Line’) status, not
caste.
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the average eligible household.
The main outcome variable is the household ‘knowledge score’. A knowledge test was
fielded, in each of the four mini-surveys, to all interviewed households across the three
experimental arms. Each test consisted of eight questions about particulars of the RSBY
scheme, including eligibility, cost, cover, exclusions and how to obtain care. The exact
questions used in the knowledge tests are provided in Appendix B. Each answer was
recorded and later coded as being correct or incorrect. The number of correct answers
gives each interviewed household a score between 0 (least knowledgeable) and 8 (most
knowledgeable).19
The test questions asked in the four surveys were di↵erent, so although the raw scores
can be compared across households within a survey, they cannot easily be compared
across surveys, even for individual households. The scores on each test were therefore
standardised by subtracting the test-wise mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
4 Evidence
4.1 The Impact of Agents on Knowledge
Consider first the impact of knowledge agents on household knowledge score. The basic
specification is
Yhv = ↵ +  Tv + ✏hv. (2)
The outcome variable Yhv is the test z-score for household h in village v. Tv is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the household lives in a treatment village (a village with a knowledge
agent of either type) and 0 otherwise. The coe cient   captures the average e↵ect on
test score of being in a treated village, and ↵ is a constant reflecting the average test
score in the control group.
The results of regression (2) are presented in Table 3, column 1. Households living in a
treatment village score 0.18 standard deviations higher on the knowledge test compared
to households in the control villages. Column 2 indicates that this e↵ect is robust to
the inclusion of fixed e↵ects for taluk (the administrative unit below district) and time
(survey wave).
In column 3, the treatment e↵ect is estimated separately for flat-pay and incentive-pay
agents, while still including taluk and time fixed e↵ects. The estimated e↵ect of flat-pay
agents on test scores, while positive, is not statistically significant. This is consistent with
the argument that, since these agents are paid a constant amount irrespective of outcome,
19Question 8 on the third test is di cult to mark as correct or incorrect, as there are several ways in
which an RSBY member might plausibly check whether a particular condition will be covered ahead of
visiting a hospital. For this reason the question is omitted when computing the overall score and the
maximum score on the third test is taken to be 7.
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they are not incentivised to exert any e↵ort beyond the level determined by their intrinsic
motivation. In contrast, households in villages assigned an incentive-pay agent score 0.25
standard deviations higher on the knowledge test than those in the control group. Hence,
providing agents with financial incentives leads to an improvement in knowledge about
the scheme among beneficiaries. Moreover, equality of these two coe cients is rejected.
This suggests that, looking at the sample overall, the entire e↵ect of knowledge-spreading
agents is due to the agents that are on incentive-pay contracts.20
As already mentioned, an administrative error caused incentive-pay agents in one
district (Bangalore Rural) to be overpaid after the first survey. To allay concerns that
our findings are driven by these higher rates of pay, Table 4 presents results using data
only from Shimoga district, where no error was made. Overall, the qualitative findings
concerning the main coe cients of interest are similar to those obtained in Table 3.
Hence, it appears that the main findings are not driven by the larger payments made to
agents in one district for one of the four rounds.
E↵ects by survey round and by agent characteristics are presented in Appendix C.
4.2 The Impact of Agents on Enrolment
Next consider the impact of knowledge agents on programme enrolment. Although the
agents were not incentivised to enrol household into the scheme, it is conceivable that
increased knowledge about the scheme might induce enrolment. Enrolment is also of
primary policy relevance.
The results are presented in Table 5. Households living in a treatment village are on
average 4.5 percentage points more likely to enrol into the scheme compared to households
in the control villages, although this e↵ect is not statistically significant (column 1).
Controlling for taluk and wave fixed e↵ects does not change this result (column 2). Once
we disaggregate the treatment e↵ect by agent contract type, we find that households
living in a treatment village where the agent was on an incentive-pay contract are 7.5
percentage points more likely to be enrolled relative to control group, significant at 5%.
No significant impact is found for those living in a treatment village where the agent
was on a flat-pay contract. As with the knowledge score results reported above, we are
able to reject the equality of the two coe cients at the 5% level. Thus, we find robust
evidence that incentivising agents for dissemination of programme knowledge also boosted
programme enrolment rates.
20We also check whether baseline agent characteristics play any role in explaining their e cacy in
knowledge transmission, and find that the only one that is significant (at the 10% level) is autonomy
(see Appendix Table A.3).
18
4.3 Incentives and Social Distance
The results so far suggest that monetary incentives matter for how e↵ective agents are
at disseminating information about the scheme and increasing enrolment. But previous
work suggests that social identity is also an important determinant of insurance take-
up. Cole et al. (2013) find that demand for rainfall insurance is significantly a↵ected by
whether the picture on the associated leaflet (a farmer in front of either a Hindu temple
or a mosque) matches the religion of the potential buyer.
This section asks whether matching agents with target households in terms of social
characteristics has an e↵ect on knowledge scores that is independent of the e↵ect of
incentive pay. Also, it investigates whether the e↵ects of social distance and incentive
pay are purely additive or whether they reinforce or weaken each other.
A simple metric of social distance was constructed as follows: First, we created four
binary variables which capture basic social dimensions and for which we have data for
both the agent and eligible households: forward/dominant caste status (0/1), whether the
household head has completed primary school (0/1), ration-card status (0/1) and home
ownership (0/1). In each of these four dimensions, define the social distance between
an agent and a household as the absolute di↵erence in the agent’s and the household’s
characteristics. To take ration-card status as an example, ration-card distance is set to 0
if either both have a ration card or if neither of them does. Ration-card distance is 1 if
any one of them has a ration card and the other does not.
The composite social distance metric is the simple sum across the four individual
distance measures, normalised to lie between zero and one by dividing by four.
Before turning to the main specification, consider the basic di↵erence-in-di↵erences
calculation in Table 6. We create a binary variable, ‘socially proximate pair’, indicating
whether or not the composite social distance metric is equal to or less than 0.5. The
mean knowledge scores for socially proximate and socially distant household–agent pairs
are tabulated by agent contract type. Reading the table row by row, flat-pay agents are
significantly more e↵ective at transmitting knowledge to socially proximate households
than to the socially distant households—average scores are higher by 0.14 standard devi-
ations. For incentivised agents there is no significant di↵erence in performance between
close and distant pairs, and the di↵erence in di↵erence is significant. Alternatively, read-
ing the table column by column, incentive pay seems not to a↵ect knowledge transmission
in proximate pairs, but it increases knowledge transmission in distant agent–household
pairs, up to about the same level as for proximate pairs. Note that the socially distant
households who are assigned a flat-pay agent score significantly lower than any of the
other three groups, which is indicative of the disadvantage created by social distance in
the absence of incentive pay. In summary, the di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis suggests
that incentive pay has the e↵ect of neutralising social distance as an impediment to the
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transmission of knowledge — a finding that will be corroborated by regression analysis.
The main empirical specification for this section is
Yhv = ↵ +  Dhv +  Tv +  DhvTv + ⇡Xhv + uhv. (3)
Here, Dhv denotes social distance between household h in village v and the agent in village
v. Tv is a binary variable indicating whether the agent in village v is on an incentive-
pay contract. (The control villages are necessarily dropped from this analysis since the
distance metrics are not defined when there is no agent.) Xhv are level variables for each
of the agent and household characteristics that are considered in the construction of the
social distance metrics.
The coe cient   captures the e↵ect21 of social distance on knowledge when the agent
is not incentivised. The coe cient   captures the e↵ect of incentive pay for socially
proximate (non-distant) agent–household pairs. Finally,   captures the di↵erential e↵ect
of incentive pay for socially distant agent–household pairs relative to socially proximate
ones.
The results are presented in Table 7. Column 1 confirms that incentive-pay agents
have a significant and positive impact on knowledge compared to flat-pay agents, even
when controlling for agent and household caste, education, ration-card status and home-
ownership as well as taluk and time fixed e↵ects.
Column 2 presents results for the composite social distance metric. The un-interacted
treatment e↵ect is not significant, while the coe cients on social distance and the interac-
tion of incentive pay with social distance are both highly significant and roughly opposite
in magnitude. We interpret this in three steps: First, it confirms that social distance has
a negative impact on knowledge transmission. Second, putting agents on an incentive-
pay contract has a positive e↵ect on knowledge transmission, but only for socially distant
agent–household pairs. And third, the e↵ect of providing financial incentives (at our level
of bonus pay) is more or less exactly the level required to cancel out the negative e↵ect
due to social distance. In other words, the e↵ect of incentive pay seems to be to cancel
the negative e↵ect of social distance, but no more. Loosely speaking, we may say that
incentive pay appears to ‘price out prejudice’, though the e↵ects of social distance are
not necessarily a function of prejudice alone. For example, socially proximate pairs may
meet more often socially, reducing the cost of e↵ort required to transmit information.
See Appendix D for a discussion of the magnitude of the main e↵ect relative to the
incentive.
In Indian villages, caste groups sometimes live in distinct sub-villages called hamlets.
This means that the social distance between a pair of households in the village may
21The words ‘e↵ect’ and ‘impact’ are used for ease of exposition, but we cannot make the same claims
of causality in this part of the analysis since social characteristics were not randomly allocated.
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be positively correlated with the physical distance between them. To the extent that
this is the case, it is possible that the results so far confound the e↵ect on knowledge
transmission of social distance with that of physical distance. After all, it seems natural
that the cost of knowledge transmission increases with the physical distance between the
agent and a household.
We test for the role of physical distance using two separate measures. The first
measure is whether or not caste groups in a village tend to live apart. This information
is available for 107 out of the 147 villages. Based on this information, a binary indicator
is constructed which is equal to 1 if, in a given village, the settlements of the major caste
groups are physically separated, and 0 otherwise. This indicator is 1 for 26 out of 107
villages. Returning to Table 7, this indicator and its interaction with the incentive-pay
variable are included in the regression in column 3.
While the sample size drops, the results in column 3 confirm that physical separation
does have a negative e↵ect on knowledge transmission. Similarly to the results for social
distance, the coe cient on the interaction of incentive pay and physical distance is of
opposite sign and roughly equal magnitude to the un-interacted physical distance term.
While the interaction term is not statistically significant, this may indicate that incentive
pay can overcome barriers to physical distance. But the results also show that the social
distance indicator and its interaction with incentive-pay are still significant at the 10%
and 5% levels, respectively, and do not drop much in magnitude. This indicates that
social distance matters, even after controlling for physical distance.
The measure of physical distance used above is crude, and it is conceivable that the
the social distance measure still captures some physical distance e↵ect. Hence, we use a
second and more accurate measure of physical distance in the form of the actual straight-
line distance in metres between the agent’s and the household’s dwellings, constructed
from GPS coordinates collected in the field. Since this data was only collected during
the fourth survey wave, this analysis can only be done for a subset of the total sample.
Using this second measure, we find results in column 4 that are qualitatively similar those
obtained with the crude measure in column 3. The coe cient on social distance indicator
is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels, possibly due to the fact that
the sample size drops by almost a third. But the coe cient continues to be of opposite
sign to that of its interaction term with incentive-pay. In addition, both the coe cient
on social distance and that on the interaction term are not significantly di↵erent from
those obtained in column 2 without the inclusion of physical distance (p-values for the
F -tests are 0.38 and 0.74 respectively), which increases our confidence that these results
are less likely to be driven by confounding factors. Moreover, this measure of physical
distance does not appear to exert any independent influence on knowledge scores.
Columns 5–8 repeat the exercise in column 2 for each of the sub-component distance
metrics. For distance in caste, ration-card status and home ownership, the story appears
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to align in general with the findings for the overall distant metric presented above, al-
beit not always with full significance. However, for education, there appears to be no
significant disadvantage due to social distance. In other words, agent–household commu-
nication appears to be hampered by di↵erences in caste, ration-card status and possibly
home ownership, but not by di↵erences in education. Correspondingly, in this specifica-
tion, un-interacted incentive pay has a large and positive co-e cient. That is, agents do
not appear to be at a disadvantage when communicating with households with a di↵erent
educational background to themselves, and the introduction of incentives correspondingly
boosts results for socially proximate and distant households alike.
It is of interest to examine whether the impact of social distance and its interaction
with incentive-pay is symmetric across the caste hierarchy in the context of knowledge
scores. In other words, is the impact of social distance between agent and beneficiary
household more severe when a lower-caste agent interacts with a higher-caste household
than vice versa? To test this, we compute di↵erences-in-di↵erences in mean e↵ects by
agent caste group. The results, presented in Appendix Table A.1, suggest that the quali-
tative findings are symmetric: irrespective of the agent’s own caste group, the coe cient
representing the e↵ect of introducing incentive pay is greater with respect to the cross-
group than to the own group. However, the di↵erence in di↵erence is only statistically
significant for dominant-caste agents.
Table 8 presents corresponding results for our other main outcome variable, enrolment.
The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained for knowledge scores, and with
greater significance for the composite measure of social distance (columns 2–4). Once
again the main role of incentives is to cancel out the negative e↵ects of social distance.
This finding is robust to the inclusion of controls for either measure of physical distance.
Taken together, the analysis in this section suggests that social distance can lower the
e cacy of welfare programmes through reduced knowledge transmission and enrolment,
and that the use of incentive pay can counter-act this e↵ect.
Appendix E considers a change in the agents’ allocation of time as a potential mech-
anism for the results on incentive pay and social distance. Appendix F interprets the
main findings in terms of our theoretical model.
5 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the role of financial incentives and social proximity in motivating
local agents to transmit knowledge about a public service. The results suggest, first,
that hiring agents to spread knowledge about welfare programmes has a positive impact
on the level of knowledge, but that the entire e↵ect is driven by agents on incentive-
pay contracts. Second, agents on incentive-pay contracts have a positive and significant
impact on programme enrolment. Third, social distance between agent and beneficiary
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has a negative impact on knowledge transmission and enrolment, but putting agents on
incentive-pay contracts increases knowledge transmission and enrolment by cancelling
out (at our level of bonus pay) the negative e↵ect of social distance. On the other
hand, incentive pay has no impact on knowledge transmission or enrolment for socially
proximate agent–beneficiary pairs. A likely mechanism is a reallocation of time spent by
incentive-pay agents with socially distant households at the expense of socially proximate
ones.
Our results may have implications for public service delivery in developing countries,
where, in addition to common supply-side problems like sta↵ absenteeism, corruption and
red tape, a lack of awareness and knowledge regarding available welfare schemes repre-
sents an important barrier to the take-up of government programmes. The experimental
evidence presented here points to a key mechanism that may in some circumstances
alleviate this problem.
Our findings concerning the relative importance of financial incentives and social
distance have implications for contexts in which strong own-group bias can lead to adverse
welfare e↵ects. In India, caste and religious identities, in particular, have been found to
create social divisions that impede the e cient functioning of markets (Anderson, 2011)
and access to public goods (Banerjee et al., 2005; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007). It
would be hasty to extrapolate from our findings in the context of information transmission
about welfare schemes to wider societal e↵ects of own-group bias. Still, in the setting
studied, a relatively small piece rate was su cient to overcome the negative consequences
of entrenched social barriers.
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Figure 1: The one-task solution
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Figure 2: A solution without crowding out (  < c1 < c2).
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Figure 3: A solution with temporary satiation in e2 (  = c1 < c2)
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Figure 4: A solution with crowding out (c1 <   < c2)
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Table 1: Agent Summary Statistics
Flat pay Incentive pay Di↵erence
Agent age 34.8 34.8 0.018
(8.81) (8.08) [1.73]
Agent is married 0.81 0.92 0.10
(0.40) (0.28) [0.073]
Agent is of forward/dominant caste 0.43 0.35 -0.080
(0.50) (0.48) [0.10]
Agent’s household head has completed 0.62 0.56 -0.058
primary school (0.49) (0.50) [0.10]
Agent household has ration card 0.89 0.79 -0.10
(0.31) (0.41) [0.071]
Agent owns her home 0.86 0.87 0.0084
(0.35) (0.34) [0.069]
Agent is Self-Help Group president 0.30 0.28 -0.016
(0.46) (0.45) [0.093]
Agent autonomy score (the higher, 5.57 5.68 0.11
the more autonomous) (0.93) (0.84) [0.18]
Observations 37 71
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Robust standard errors for the di↵erence
tests are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Household Summary Statistics
Control Flat Inc’tive Flat Inc’tive Inc’tive
pay pay  Control  Control  Flat
Household is of forward/ 0.22 0.18 0.15 -0.041 -0.068* -0.027
dominant caste (0.42) (0.39) (0.36) [0.046] [0.037] [0.036]
Household head has com- 0.29 0.23 0.30 -0.057* 0.0042 0.061**
pleted primary school (0.45) (0.42) (0.46) [0.032] [0.029] [0.026]
Household has ration card 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.0040 -0.0037 -0.0077
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) [0.020] [0.019] [0.018]
Household owns its home 0.65 0.63 0.64 -0.024 -0.010 0.014
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) [0.042] [0.034] [0.038]
Household knowledge -0.11 -0.028 0.11 0.077 0.21*** 0.14
score, mean (0.74) (0.79) (0.80) [0.094] [0.077] [0.087]
Household is enrolled, 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.0029 0.058 0.055
mean (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) [0.051] [0.039] [0.044]
Social distance to agent - 0.39 0.37 - - -0.023
(0.24) (0.26) [0.035]
Agent time spent with - 15.9 15.6 - - -0.33
household, in minutes (26.6) (33.4) [3.23]
Observations 919 886 1634
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors for the di↵erence tests, clustered at
the village level, are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: The E↵ect of Agents on Knowledge
(1) (2) (3)
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge
Agent in village 0.175*** 0.190***
(0.0662) (0.0611)
Flat-pay agent in village 0.0677
(0.0842)
Incentive-pay agent in village 0.252***
(0.0623)
Survey wave fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Taluk fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Observations 7730 7730 7730
t-test: flat=incentivised (p-value) 0.0198
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. Each household is given the same weight,
divided equally between all observations of that household. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered at the village level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: The E↵ect Agents on Knowledge, Shimoga District Only
(1) (2) (3)
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge
Agent in village 0.222*** 0.202***
(0.0752) (0.0699)
Flat-pay agent in village 0.0315
(0.106)
Incentive-pay agent in village 0.301***
(0.0694)
Survey wave fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Taluk fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Observations 3954 3954 3954
t-test: flat=incentivised (p-value) 0.0190
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. Each household is given the same weight,
divided equally between all observations of that household. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered at the village level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: The E↵ect of Agents on Enrolment
(1) (2) (3)
Have enrolled Have enrolled Have enrolled
Agent in village 0.0445 0.0465
(0.0352) (0.0325)
Flat-pay agent in village -0.0102
(0.0434)
Incentive-pay agent in village 0.0754**
(0.0332)
Survey wave fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Taluk fixed e↵ects No Yes Yes
Observations 7730 7730 7730
t-test: flat=incentivised (p-value) 0.0294
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. Each household is given the same weight, divided
equally between all observations of that household. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clus-
tered at the village level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Di↵erence in Di↵erences: Mean Knowledge Scores by
Contract Type and Social Distance
Socially proximate Socially distant Di↵erence
pairs pairs
Flat pay 0.05 -0.09 0.14**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Incentive pay 0.12 0.13 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Di↵erence -0.07 -0.22*** 0.14***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ‘Socially proximate pairs’ is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the composite social distance metric is equal
to or less than 0.5 and 0 otherwise. This table uses only the sample of
treatment villages, i.e. villages with agents, since control villages contain
no agents. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Incentives and Social Distance - E↵ect on Knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge
Incentive pay 0.156** -0.0499 -0.0894 -0.100 0.0529 0.220** 0.0799 0.0901
(0.0781) (0.114) (0.133) (0.131) (0.0940) (0.102) (0.0805) (0.0894)
Social distance -0.429** -0.372* -0.328 -0.226** 0.0862 -0.240** -0.123
(0.183) (0.210) (0.228) (0.0992) (0.0881) (0.118) (0.0798)
Incentive pay x social 0.559*** 0.483** 0.517** 0.254** -0.123 0.398*** 0.188**
distance (0.194) (0.212) (0.234) (0.122) (0.105) (0.136) (0.0898)
Castes live apart -0.278**
(0.122)
Incentive pay x castes 0.260
live apart (0.165)
Physical distance -0.0272
(0.0716)
Incentive pay x physical 0.00673
distance (0.0834)
Agent and household
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave and taluk
fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social distance metric - Composite Composite Composite Caste only Education Ration-card Home owner-
only status only ship only
Observations 4854 4854 3877 3189 4854 4854 4854 4854
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. The regressions use data only from treatment villages, i.e. villages with agents, since the distance measures
are not defined for villages without agents. Each household is given the same weight, divided equally between all observations of that household. Stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. In all columns, agent and household characteristics are binary indicators for whether the
agent and household are of forward/dominant caste, whether the head has completed primary school, whether they have a ration card and whether
they own their home. The simple social distance metrics in columns 5–8 are binary variables equal to the absolute di↵erence between the correspond-
ing household and agent characteristic binaries. The composite social distance metric in columns 2–4 is the sum of the binary distance metrics for
caste, education, ration-card status and home ownership, divided by 4. ‘Castes live apart’ is a binary indicator for whether castes are separated into
separate zones in the village, and ‘physical distance’ is the great-circle distance in metres between the agent and household dwellings. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Incentives and Social Distance - E↵ect on Enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled Enrolled
Incentive pay 0.0648* -0.0700 -0.100 -0.115 0.0116 0.0527 0.00664 0.0529
(0.0388) (0.0548) (0.0674) (0.0768) (0.0398) (0.0424) (0.0354) (0.0472)
Social distance -0.238** -0.212* -0.348** -0.0630 -0.0286 -0.237*** -0.00297
(0.0983) (0.112) (0.138) (0.0507) (0.0355) (0.0664) (0.0420)
Incentive pay x social 0.368*** 0.313** 0.396** 0.133** 0.0221 0.306*** 0.0348
distance (0.132) (0.134) (0.174) (0.0651) (0.0467) (0.0942) (0.0483)
Castes live apart -0.0727
(0.0642)
Incentive pay x castes 0.173**
live apart (0.0820)
Physical distance -0.0544
(0.0446)
Incentive pay x physical -0.00202
distance (0.0592)
Agent and household
characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave and taluk
fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social distance metric - Composite Composite Composite Caste only Education Ration-card Home owner-
only status only ship only
Observations 4854 4854 3877 3189 4854 4854 4854 4854
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. The regressions use data only from treatment villages, i.e. villages with agents, since the distance
measures are not defined for villages without agents. Each household is given the same weight, divided equally between all observations of that
household. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. In all columns, agent and household characteristics are binary indi-
cators for whether the agent and household are of forward/dominant caste, whether the head has completed primary school, whether they have a
ration card and whether they own their home. The simple social distance metrics in columns 5–8 are binary variables equal to the absolute dif-
ference between the corresponding household and agent characteristic binaries. The composite social distance metric in columns 2–4 is the sum
of the binary distance metrics for caste, education, ration-card status and home ownership, divided by 4. ‘Castes live apart’ is a binary indicator
for whether castes are separated into separate zones in the village, and ‘physical distance’ is the great-circle distance in metres between the agent
and household dwellings. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Testing for Symmetry: Di↵erences in Di↵erences in Knowl-
edge Score, by Agent Caste Category
Dominant-caste agent
Dominant Non-dominant Di↵erence (Dom-Non)
household household
Flat pay 0.05 -0.11 0.16*
(0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
Incentive pay 0.06 0.09 -0.03
(0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
Di↵erence (Inc-Flat) 0.01 0.20*** -0.19*
(0.11) (0.05) (0.11)
Non-dominant-caste agent
Dominant Non-dominant Di↵erence (Dom-Non)
household household
Flat pay -0.13 0.06 -0.19**
(0.07) (0.04) (0.09)
Incentive pay 0.07 0.15 -0.08
(0.06) (0.02) (0.07)
Di↵erence (Inc-Flat) 0.20** 0.09** 0.11
(0.10) (0.04) (0.10)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. This table uses only the sample of treat-
ment villages, i.e. villages with agents, since control villages contain no agents. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: The E↵ect of Agents on Knowledge, by Survey Round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge Knowledge
Flat-pay agent 0.00265 0.233* -0.0591 0.113 0.0273
in village (0.115) (0.119) (0.109) (0.128) (0.133)
Incentive-pay agent 0.206** 0.367*** 0.128 0.268** 0.214**
in village (0.0794) (0.0886) (0.0930) (0.116) (0.0845)
Wave 2 x flat-pay 0.182
agent in village (0.183)
Wave 3 x flat-pay -0.0735
agent in village (0.150)
Wave 4 x flat-pay 0.0329
agent in village (0.198)
Wave 2 x incentive- 0.176
pay agent in village (0.146)
Wave 3 x incentive- -0.0389
pay agent in village (0.120)
Wave 4 x incentive- 0.0164
pay agent in village (0.166)
Wave 2 fixed e↵ect -0.183
(0.118)
Wave 3 fixed e↵ect 0.00690
(0.0895)
Wave 4 fixed e↵ect -0.0428
(0.142)
Taluk fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey wave 1 2 3 4 All
Observations 2360 1931 1346 2093 7730
t-test: flat=incentivised
(p-val) 0.0696 0.244 0.0482 0.151
Joint signif. (p-val) of
Wave 2 x flat - Wave 4 x flat 0.571
Joint signif. (p-val) of
Wave 2 x inc. - Wave 4 x inc.
0.504
Notes: Columns 1–4 are OLS regressions. Column 5 is a weighted least-squares regression in which each
household is given the same weight, divided equally between all observations of that household. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: The E↵ect of Knowledge Agents, by Agent Characteristics
(1) (2)
Knowledge Knowledge
Treatment (agent in village) 0.190*** -0.265
(0.0611) (0.310)
Treatment x agent is 30+ 0.0359
(0.0905)
Treatment x agent is 50+ -0.0736
(0.132)
Treatment x agent of forward/dominant caste -0.105
(0.0841)
Treatment x agent household head -0.101
has completed primary school (0.0810)
Treatment x agent has ration card -0.0529
(0.105)
Treatment x agent owns her home 0.0852
(0.128)
Treatment x agent is Self-Help Group president -0.00685
(0.0682)
Treatment x agent autonomy 0.0899*
(0.0462)
Survey wave fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Taluk fixed e↵ects Yes Yes
Observations 7730 7730
Notes: Weighted least squares regressions. Each household is given the same weight,
divided equally between all observations of that household. Standard errors, in paren-
theses, are clustered at the village level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4: Agent Time Spent with Household
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minutes Minutes Minutes Minutes
Incentive pay -1.059 -5.178** -5.884* -6.369**
(1.683) (2.510) (3.178) (2.944)
Social distance -8.298** -6.570 -9.965**
(3.570) (4.123) (3.862)
Incentive pay x social distance 10.96** 9.112 13.04**
(5.256) (5.776) (5.779)
Castes live apart -4.297
(4.262)
Incentive pay x castes live apart 5.901
(5.258)
Physical distance -1.544
(1.831)
Incentive pay x physical distance -0.347
(1.983)
Agent and household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Taluk fixed e↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1539 1539 1221 1459
Notes: Least squares. The regressions use data only from treatment villages, i.e. villages
with agents, since the distance measures are not defined for villages without agents.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the village level. The dependent vari-
able is the number of minutes the agent has spent with the household talking about the
programme in minutes, as reported by the household. In all columns, agent and house-
hold characteristics are binary indicators for whether the agent and household are of
forward/dominant caste, whether the head has completed primary school, have a ration
card and own their home. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
A Cases Not Captured by Figures 2–4 for the Two-
Task Model
Figures 2–4 illustrate the main classes of solutions for the two-task model. However, it
is worth noting some features of the solution space that are not captured by the figures.
First, in all three illustrated solutions, when moving from left to right (that is, in-
creasing b from minus infinity), task 2 is the first to move into the internal solution space.
While it is possible for task 1 to ‘leave’ the lower bound first, the two e↵ort curves cannot
then cross. This is because task 1 would have a ‘head start’, and when both tasks are
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internal, the slope of task 1 is always greater so that e↵ort in task 2 cannot ‘catch up’.
These cases can, therefore, be generated graphically from Figures 2–4 by shifting the
lower e↵ort boundary, e, up until it meets the crossing point of e1 and e2, or beyond.
Second, there is a set of sub-cases of Figure 4 where e2 ‘temporarily’ hits the upper
and/or lower bound only to re-emerge into the internal solution space. Graphically, the
first of these cases can be generated from Figure 4 by shifting the maximum e↵ort level
e down until it crosses the first kink in the internal e2 curve. The second is generated by
shifting the minimum e↵ort level e up until it crosses the second kink in the internal e2
curve. The third of these special cases is a combination of the first two; that is when e2
is first temporarily saturated at e and then at e before it re-emerges and finally reaches
e.
Third, while Figures 2–4 show the kinks in e2 when e1 reaches the upper or lower
bound, they do not illustrate that e1 will be similarly kinked if e2 reaches the upper or
lower bound while e1 is internal.
Fourth, it should be noted that, depending on the position of the vertical axis, not all
regions of a solution type may be feasible when b is constrained to be non-negative, as is
the case in our model.
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B The Knowledge Tests
In the first survey, the knowledge test consisted of the following eight questions (correct
answers in italics):
1. Does the programme cover the cost of treatment received while admitted to a
hospital (hospitalisation)?
Yes.
2. Does the programme cover the cost of treatment received while not admitted to a
hospital (out-patient treatment)?
No.
3. Who can join this programme?
Households designated as being Below the Poverty Line.(Those who said ‘the poor’,
‘low income’ or similar were marked as correct.)
4. What is the maximal annual expenditure covered by the scheme?
30,000 rupees.
5. How much money do you have to pay to get enrolled in the scheme?
30 rupees per year.
6. How many members of a household can be a part of the scheme?
Up to five.
7. What is the allowance per visit towards transportation to the hospital that you are
entitled to under the RSBY scheme?
100 rupees. (This was the expected answer, although strictly speaking the transporta-
tion allowance is subject to a maximum of 1000 rupees per year, i.e. ten visits.)
8. Is there an upper age limit for being covered by the scheme? If yes, what is it?
There is no upper age limit.
In the second survey, the knowledge test consisted of the following eight questions:
1. What is the maximum insurance cover provided by RSBY per annum?
30,000 rupees.
2. Does the beneficiary have to bear the cost of hospitalisation under the RSBY scheme
up to the maximum limit?
No.
3. Are pre-existing diseases covered under RSBY?
Yes.
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4. Are out-patient services covered under RSBY?
No.
5. Are day surgeries covered under RSBY?
Yes.
6. Does the scheme cover post-hospitalisation charges? If yes, up to how many days?
Yes, up to 5 days. (Anyone who answered ‘yes’ was marked as correct.)
7. Are maternity benefits covered?
Yes.
8. If a female RSBY member has given birth to a baby during the policy period, will
the baby be covered under RSBY?
Yes.
In the third survey, the knowledge test consisted of the following eight questions:
1. Under RSBY, how many family members can be enrolled in the scheme?
Five.
2. What is the maximum insurance cover provided by RSBY per policy period?
30,000 rupees.
3. If hospitalised, does an RSBY cardholder have to pay separately for his/her medicines?
No.
4. If hospitalised, does an RSBY cardholder have to pay separately for his/her diag-
nostic tests?
No.
5. Is it compulsory for an RSBY cardholder to carry the smart card while visiting the
hospital for treatment?
Yes.
6. If an RSBY cardholder is examined by a doctor for a health problem but not
admitted to the hospital, will the treatment cost be covered under RSBY?
No.
7. What is the duration/tenure of the RSBY policy period?
1 year.
8. How can an RSBY cardholder check if a particular health condition is covered under
RSBY prior to visiting the hospital for treatment?
Multiple correct answers; see text.
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In the fourth survey, the knowledge test consisted of the following eight questions:
1. Can the beneficiary go to any hospital to get treatment under RSBY?
No, only RSBY-empanelled hospitals.
2. What document does the beneficiary need to take with him/her to the hospital to
get treatment under RSBY?
RSBY card.
3. Mahesha is a construction worker who does not have a RSBY card. One day he
fell from a roof while working and broke his leg. His cousin, who has a RSBY card,
took him to a RSBY- empanelled hospital where Mahesh was treated well. The
hospital bill came to Rs 12,000. Can the cousin?s RSBY card be used to pay for
Mahesh?s treatment?
No.
4. A household has a RSBY card and has not used it since it was renewed. The wife
falls ill and is treated in a RSBY-empanelled hospital. She has to stay in hospital
for a long time, and the total bill comes to 36,000 rupees. Can this amount be
charged to the card?
No, only Rs 30,000 can be charged to the card, the rest will have to be paid by the
household.
5. If the beneficiary loses or damages the RSBY smartcard, can it be replaced?
Yes.
6. Chandrasekhar falls ill and is admitted to a RSBY-empanelled hospital. The cost
of his treatment is covered by RSBY. Will the bed charges be covered, too?
Yes, as long as the total cost is less than Rs 30,000 for the year for the whole
household.
7. Sangeeta is a housewife who signed up for RSBY with her husband. When giving
birth to their second child, she was admitted to a RSBY-empanelled hospital for
the delivery. Can the hospital costs be charged to the RSBY card?
Yes.
8. Ramappa signed up for RSBY but did not use the card the whole year. Therefore,
he wants to get the Rs 30 registration fee back. Can he?
No, and he has to pay Rs 30 again if he wants to join for another year.
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C E↵ects over time and by agent characteristics
Given that the four survey waves were conducted at di↵erent times after the recruitment
of agents, it is also possible to look at dynamics. For example, does the di↵erence in
knowledge score between households in the two experimental groups increase over time?
This is examined in Table A.2. In columns 1–4, we find that the gap between households
in the incentive-pay group and those in flat-pay and control areas is established already
in the first survey wave, and continues through the later waves. For wave 3, the two
treatment coe cients are not individually significant, possibly attributable to the smaller
sample, but we can still reject the equality of these two coe cient at 5% significance.
In column 5, we regress knowledge score on a full set of interaction terms of the two
experimental groups with the di↵erent waves. We are unable reject the null hypothesis
that the marginal e↵ects of flat-pay agents for the later waves are jointly zero, and
similarly in the case of the incentive-pay agents. Therefore, we conclude that the impact
of the two treatments is similar across all rounds.
This suggests that the extra e↵ort by the agents in the incentive-pay villages was
exerted early on. This is consistent with rational behaviour on the part of the agents
if knowledge is persistent: any extra e↵ort should be exerted early on since knowledge
imparted then would be rewarded in all subsequent payment rounds, whereas knowledge
imparted in the last round would only be rewarded once. Alternatively, it could be that
household knowledge does decay and that subsequent e↵ort by the agent is required to
maintain it. The finding is also consistent with households having a bounded ‘appetite’
for knowledge about the scheme; this is a possibility that will be revisited below.
Table A.3 looks at how the impact of knowledge agents on knowledge test scores
depends on agent characteristics. Column 1 replicates column 2 of Table 3 for ease of
reference. In column 2, the main treatment variable (whether or not there is an agent
in village) is interacted with variables on agent age, caste, education, ration-card status,
home ownership, whether the agent is president of an SHG and her personal autonomy.
While the un-interacted term is no longer significant, none of the interacted e↵ects are
significant at the 10% level except for the autonomy metric. (The autonomy variable is
described in the data section.) It seems plausible that whether an agent is free to move
around the village might be a factor in determining her e↵ectiveness.
D On magnitude
In the experiment, the agents were paid a bonus of 8 rupees (0.17 USD) for each house-
hold that answered at least four out of eight knowledge test questions correctly. Since
the average e↵ect of incentive pay is to increase knowledge levels by about 0.25 stan-
dard deviations or about 0.6 correctly answered questions on the knowledge test, crude
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extrapolation would suggest that a bonus of 13 rupees (0.28 USD) per household would
su ce to increase by one the average number of correctly answered questions. Column 3
of Table 5 suggests that a 8 rupees (0.17 USD) bonus per household raises the enrolment
rate by 8 percentage points. This modest rate of bonus pay also appears to completely
wipe out the knowledge gap between beneficiary groups that are socially proximate to
the agent and those that are not.
It may appear that the e↵ect of incentive pay is rather large compared to the rates
of pay that were o↵ered to the agents. After all, an average payment of 400 rupees
(9 USD) for work over a period of several months is not all that much, even for India’s
poor. However, whether the job was well paid or not is also a function of the hours put in.
While we do not have survey data on total agent time use (only time spent with individual
households), examination of field notes indicates that agents spend in the region of 4–5
days of full-time work equivalents per payment period. This is a rough estimate, and
clearly there will be substantial variation around the mean. But if reasonably accurate,
it would suggest that the average pay per day of work is around 100 rupees (2.17 USD),
which is of the same order of magnitude as what agricultural labourers earn. A hundred
rupees per day is also the wage rate that was o↵ered by the government’s large-scale
public-works programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee, in Karnataka at
the time of the surveys.
An alternative and more behavioural explanation for the finding that relatively small
bonus rates can have large e↵ects on outcomes is that agents may be more sensitive to
the fact that there is an incentive than to its size. This is in line with Be´nabou and Tirole
(2003), who suggest that the fact that incentive pay is o↵ered can itself convey information
to the agent about the task, the principal or the principal’s view of the agent. Clearly
there is no presumption from theory that these e↵ects will always be positive, and indeed
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) suggests they can be negative. Our finding corresponds
with results obtained in other recent work on conditional cash transfers, where the size of
transfer was not found to matter beyond the fact that there is a positive transfer (Filmer
and Schady, 2009), as well as in the context of preventive health behaviour, where demand
for services were found to be sensitive to small incentives (Thornton, 2008; Banerjee et al.,
2010b).
E Potential Mechanism: Time Spent with House-
holds
One likely mechanism by which agents may boost the knowledge scores and enrolment
rates of eligible households in their village is by spending time with them to talk about
the scheme. It is, therefore, of interest to look at how agent time allocation varies with
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contract type and social distance. In the fourth survey round, households were asked
how much time their agent had spent with them talking about the scheme over the past
three months.22
The results for time spent are presented in Table A.4. The analysis is again restricted
to treatment villages as the distance measures are not defined in villages without an
agent. In column 1, the time spent by the agent with the household talking about
the scheme is regressed on incentive-pay, and the results suggest that total time spent
with households by the agent does not depend on contract type. So while it was found
above that incentivised agents are more successful at transmitting knowledge and inducing
enrolment overall, this does not seem to be because she spends more time with households
in aggregate.
Column 2 introduces social distance and the interaction of incentive pay and social
distance. The coe cients on un-interacted incentive pay and social distance are negative
and significant, while the coe cient on the interaction term is positive and significant.
Moreover, the magnitudes are such that coe cient on the interaction is close to cancelling
out the sum of the un-interacted terms.
In column 3, physical distance measured in terms of separation of castes and its
interaction with incentive pay are introduced. While the magnitudes suggest that physical
distance may matter for time spent, the coe cients are not statistically significant. The
coe cients on un-interacted incentive pay and social distance and their interaction lose
significance but do not change much in magnitude. Using the GPS-based measure of
physical distance, on the other hand, gives us stronger results (column 4). While physical
distance continue to matter little in terms of time spent, i.e. the coe cients are smaller
and insignificant, those on social distance and its interaction with incentive-pay are now
larger in magnitude and highly significant. Thus, as in the case of knowledge scores,
these results suggests that social distance matters in its own right as far as time spent
by agent is concerned, and not just as a proxy for physical distance.
We interpret these results as follows: The type of contract does not appear to make
a great di↵erence to the average time spent with each household across the sample.
However, while agents on flat-pay contracts spend on average 8 minutes less with each
socially distant households than they do with socially proximate households (based on
column 2 of Table A.4), agents on incentive-pay contracts spend on average 3 minutes
more on socially distant households compared to socially proximate households. In other
words, incentives have little a↵ect on the time spent with households overall, but they do
appear to cause a large shift of agents’ focus from socially proximate to socially distant
households.
22This question was introduced only in the fourth and final survey wave. The households were also
asked to recall how much time the agent had spent with them earlier in the intervention. However, we
focus on the most recent period as it is probably the most accurately recollected.
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It was shown above that incentivised agents achieve superior results overall in terms
of both knowledge scores and enrolment. The results presented in this section suggest
that this was achieved without investing more time in talking to households overall.
Instead, relative to flat-pay agents, incentivised agents spend less time with their ‘own
group’ and more time with their ‘cross-group’. One interpretation of these findings is that
agent ‘intensity of e↵ort per minute’ may vary. Spending time with one’s friends may
be pleasurable and hence, in the absence of incentives, agents chose to spend more time
at a lower intensity with socially proximate households. The implication is that when
incentives are introduced, agents are able to increase intensity and hence free up time to
spend on socially distant households without sacrificing e↵ort or output with respect to
their friends.
Separate results (not reported) indicate that the time-use e↵ect is exclusively on the
‘intensive margin’: incentive-pay agents did not talk to more households overall than did
flat-pay agents.
F Relating the Empirical Results to the Theoretical
Model
The aim of this section is to tie the empirical findings back to the model. It should,
however, be noted that what follows is subject to statistical inaccuracy. That is, while
we cannot reject the equality of certain quantities, it is also possible that the true values of
these quantities are di↵erent, but not di↵erent enough to be detectable by the econometric
tests. While for simplicity we will proceed as if these equalities hold exactly, a full
discussion would consider a broader range of cases in which the e↵ort curve is nearly flat,
e↵ort across the two tasks nearly equal, and so on.
Let es(b) denote the e↵ort of a knowledge agent when dealing with her own social
group, and let eo(b) denote the e↵ort with respect to dealing with the other group.
We observe four points empirically: es(0), es(b0), eo(0) and eo(b0); that is, the e↵ort with
respect to the agent’s own and cross-group, with and without bonus. Given this notation,
the empirical findings can be summarised as follows:
eo(0) < es(0) = es(b
0) = eo(b0)
In words, the task of transmitting information to the agent’s own group is intrinsically
preferred. The introduction of bonus pay induces no change in e↵ort in the intrinsically
preferred task, but it does increase e↵ort in the non-preferred task, up to the same level
as for the intrinsically preferred task.
The most straightforward interpretation is that with respect to their own group, agents
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were already exerting the maximum e↵ort, and, therefore, bonus pay induces no additional
e↵ort. With respect to the other group, the agents were choosing a sub-maximal e↵ort
level without bonus, but with bonus pay the e↵ort goes up to the maximum level. We do
not observe crowding out, but we cannot rule it out outside of the observed parameter
values. Specifically, given more variation in b, we might encounter a region in which e↵ort
with respect to one of the groups decreases with b. Unfortunately, from the four points
we observe, we cannot tell whether or not we are in a ‘crowding-out’ world.
In Figures 2–4, the position of the vertical axes correspond to cases that are consistent
with the empirical findings. At b = 0, e1 has reached the maximum e↵ort level while e2
has not. A su ciently high bonus b would bring e2 up to e where it would be equal to
e1. If this reflects the empirical reality, then task 1, the easier task, corresponds to the
agent’s own group.
However, another possibility is generated by shifting e in Figures 2–4 down until it
meets, or crosses, the meeting point of the internal solutions. The vertical axis would
now need to be placed to the left of the crossing point. This configuration would generate
a solution in which e2, the harder task, corresponds to the agent’s own group. For this
to be the case, ✓2, the intrinsic motivation for success in the own-group task would need
to be not only greater than ✓1 but large enough to outweigh the cost disadvantage.
As an example of the latter, imagine that, irrespective of the agent’s own identity, it
is easier to transmit knowledge to high-caste than low-caste households, perhaps because
high-caste households tend to be better educated. Then, irrespective of the caste of the
agent, task 1 (the easier task) corresponds to high-caste households and task 2 to low-
caste households. If so, for a low-caste agent to intrinsically prefer the task of transmitting
information to her own caste group, which is what we observe, her intrinsic motivation
for the own-group task, ✓2, needs to be large enough, relative to ✓1, to outweigh the
cost disadvantage. Whilst the cost-of-e↵ort parameters ci and the preference parameters
thetai are distinct concepts theoretically, empirically we are unable to distinguish the
e↵ect of low task preference (‘prejudice’) from high cost of e↵ort.
It is also possible that the apparent convergence of the e↵ort curves is not due to
having reached the maximum e↵ort level as assumed above, but rather that one of the
e↵ort curves is flat, as in Figure 3. If the vertical axis were to the left of the crossing point,
and the positive bonus pay observation b = b0 were exactly at the crossing point, this
could explain the empirical findings. However, we find this possibility less likely than the
two described above, because it would require the arbitrarily chosen experimental value
for bonus pay to have hit exactly the ‘sweet spot’ (the crossing point), which is unlikely.
Though the empirical findings are supportive of the model’s assumption of an upper
limit to agent e↵ort, the theory does not explain why such an upper limit should exist
in the first place. One possibility is that households ‘max out’ on the knowledge tests,
thereby creating an upper bound on agent performance. If households attain the maxi-
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mum score, any further e↵ort would be unobservable and hence, from the point of view of
incentive-pay, futile. However, a quick look at the distribution of test scores reveals that
the households are generally nowhere near the level of test scores where such saturation
could become important. In particular, only 5% of households answered seven or eight
out of eight questions correctly.
Another, and in our view more likely, possibility is that the upper bound e is not
imposed by the test or the agent but by the household. The agent might be willing to
sit with the households for long periods of time to teach them the intricacies of RSBY,
especially if they are incentivised to do so, but households may have limited time or
patience for this. Field anecdotes suggest that households think of the agent as a resource
person who can be contacted if the need arises: if a household member falls ill or otherwise
needs health care, they will turn to the agent and ask her advice on how to obtain
treatment under the scheme. If this perspective is widespread, it would not be surprising
if the households’ motivation for learning details about the insurance policy is limited.
They only need basic knowledge about the scheme, and for this reason their patience
with listening to details will probably ‘max out’ relatively quickly.
The model is mute on the relationship between e↵ort and time. But our results
suggest that, relative to flat-pay agents, agents on incentive pay are able to increase
overall e↵ort/output without spending more time in aggregate. Instead, we observe a re-
allocation of time away from socially proximate to socially distant households. If intensity
of e↵ort can vary over time, non-incentivised agents may be spending more time with
socially proximate households (their ‘friends’) than strictly necessary, presumably because
they enjoy it. When incentives are introduced, agents are able to reallocate time away
from socially proximate households towards time spent with socially distant households
by increasing the intensity (i.e., reducing idle but enjoyable ‘chatter’) of the time spent
with their ‘friends’.
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